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THE LAW AND CORE PUBLIC HEALlli FUNCTIONS related to bioterrorism, focusing on the government's use of emergency public health powers with respect to records, property, persons, and communications. Finally, this chapter emphasizes the need for public health officers to understand the use of legal authorities as a tool in protecting the public's health.
mSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: SOURCES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY IN PUBLIC HEAL m INTERVENTIONS
The concept of using the power of the state to control infectious disease is neither new nor novel. The Old Testament-specifically, Leviticus, Numbers, and the First Book of Samuel-gave specific instructions for the sequestration of lepers and detailed how-toe priests were to examine people for leprosy. 2 In Medieval Europe, lepers were required to wear special costumes and to limit their walks to certain roads, and they were forbidden from gathering in public places such as marketplaces, inns, and taverns. The term quarantine is derived from the Italian quaranta and the Latin quadragina and refers to the period of time, 40 days, during which health authorities thought a disease to be contagious? Torture, exile, and death were among the penalties for violating a land , -or maritime quarantine.2 Although many governments have used coercive measures in the name of public health, not all public health interventions are necessarily coercive. In 1855, Dr. John Snow published an expanded version of his pamphlet, "On the Mode of Communication of Cholera," in which he argued that cholera was spread primarily through contaminated drinking water and not through casual contact with infected persons.3 Dr. Snow's theory was based on his investigation of the "Broad Street" pump, in which he discovered that all of the suspected cholera-associated deaths in London were among persons who had drunk from that pump rather than from one of the other public water pumps in the area.3 Dr. Snow's public health ilirervention was simply TO remove the pump handle, thereby ending the epidemic.
In the United States, the major source of legal authority for public health interventions is the police power, defined as the inherent authority of all sovereign governments to enact laws and promote regulations that safeguard the health, welfare, and morals of its citizens.2 Under the authority of the police power, for example, states have enacted laws for nuisance abatement, traffic safety, and firearms safety. In Colonial times, public health interventions were primarily exercised at the local level, with the earliest municipal ordinances enacted by Boston in 1647 and New York in 1663.2 Local boards of health were eventually organized, leading to more extensive state public health laws and regulations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, such public health powers as quarantine were well-established. 2 The Tenth Ame~dment reserves to the states all powers not 
THE CASE OF BIOTERRORISM
Although public health officers may find an understanding of legal authorities useful in their day-to-day practice, the threat of bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases has made such an understanding essential. One reason an effective public health response is critical is the unique nature of biologic weapons; a biologic weapon has the same potential to cause mass casualties as a nuclear weapon.lo.c In 1970, the World Health Organization released a report estimating that a 50 kilogram r~ of anthrax spores along a 2 km line upwind of a city of 500,000 would in 3 days cause 125,000 infections and 95,000 deaths.11 Furthermore, even without a large number of casualties, the disruption and fear caused by a potential bioterrorism event would be significant. In 1994, for example, a naturally oeeumng outbreak of bubonic plague in Surat, India, caused an estimated 500,000 residents-including a large portion of the city's private physicians-to flee.12 This occurred despite the availability of antibiotics such as tetracycline and doxycycline, which are usually 100% effective if administered in the ~st stages of the illness or simply after a suspected exposure. 12 If a bioterrorist event occurs, an effective, well-considered, and lawful response will help ensure public safety and ward off the panic and dread that a terrorist may hope to cause. Many of the legal authorities for responding to an epidemic, whether natural or human made, may already exist. For example, it is not unusual for public healt. In this regard, 1\ review of the BQstonsmallpox epidemi~ of 1901-1903, which resulted in 1596 cases of smallpox and 270 deaths in a ci~ population of approximately 500,000, is insightful.! The Boston Board of Health took steps to control the epidemic, including isolating patients with smallpox in special facilities, placing persons who had been in contact with or exposed to patients under surveillance, and establishing a pfegfam-of mandatory house-to-house vaccinations.! Persons who refused vaccination were subject to a $5 fine or a IS-day jail sentence.! Although ultimately successful in controlling the epidemic, the Board of Health engaged in activities that would not be tolerated today. The Board of Healtf1, for example;eriiployed "virus squads" that resorted to physical violence to vaccinate the homeless, whom the public had blamed for spreading the epidemic.! The Board also engaged in medically and ethically questionable practices by challenging vaccination opponents to expose themselves to smallpox and, in one case, allowing such an opponent to tour a smallpox ward without the benefit of vaccination.\ Although unimaginable today, such abuses nonetheless underscore the importance of public health officers operating within a legal and ethical framework.
Several emergency public health 20wers-exist that the government may need to control or mitigate a bioterrorism event or serious outbreak of disease. Although not an exclusive list, these powers fall under the broad categories of (1) collection of records and data, (2) control of property, (3) management of persons, (4) dissemination of information, and (5) legal immunity or indemnification for public health officers responding to an emergency.!3 The remainder of this chapter analyzes the legal authorities and restrictions on the use of each of these public health powers.
Collection of Records and Data: Disease Reporting, Surveillance, and PrivacyÕ ne of the most well-known public health powers is that of surveillance, derived from a French word meaning "a close watch or guard kept over a person."2 In this respect, the police power authorizes states to mandate reporting of infectious diseases and sometimes injuries and other health conditions. Which diseases are reportable, under what conditions they must be reported, and who has the duty of reporting vary from state to state. To detect and respond adequately to an act of bioterrorism, however, public health officers may need additional authorities beyond surveillance and disease reporting. For example, because a terrorist may not necessarily announce th~ease of a biologic agent, public health officers may learn of an event only through unusual mechanisms, such as a large increase in workplace absenteeism or in the sale of certain types of medications. Similarly, access to hospital records and the ability to share that information with other agencies may assisLlaVv. enforcement and public health -officers to either track down the perpetrators or discover which biologic agent has been used. In addition, many infectious agents that affect human health, such as West Nile virus and certain strains of influenza virus, may first manifest the;mselves in animals. Accordingly, public health officers should examine whether authorities exist that would" allow them to access hospital and provider records; share data with law enforcement and other entities; and mandate reporting of veterinary illnesses, workplace absenteeism, and sales of medications from phannacies.14 Notwithstanding the public health importance of disease reporting and surveillance, the disclosure of ~aU~nnation raises legitimate public concerns about privacy, particularly regarding sensitive information that may lead to stigmatization and discrimination. Although courts have recognized state authority under the police power to mandate reporting of medical information, states must have adequate procedural p;:otections-in place to safeguard patient confidentiality. In Whalen v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York statute requiring physicians to r~port information about certain prescription drugs because, among other factors, the state had adequate procedures in place to protect against unauthorized ac~ess.15 At the federal level, statutes such as the Privacy Act of 1974, subject to certain exceptions (e.g., those governing "routine uses"), generally require that federal agencies not disclose "any record" that exists within a "system of records" controlled by those agencies. 16 State laws, to varying degrees, may also govern the privacy of medical records and public health reports gathered through surveillance and follow-up investigation. In addition, 202 THE LAW AND CORE PUBLIC HEALTH FUNCTIONS while creating exemptions for public health, proposed federal regulations enacted pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 may potentially limit a health-care provider's ability to disclose confidential patient information without consent. 17 In addition to medical records, public health departments may also need access to nonprivileged business records such as customer lists, shipping information, and other information about business practices. For example, if an outbreak occurs in a hotel, the local health department may have to know what other guests have stayed in the hotel. A constitutional limitation on a health department's ability to obtain such information may be the Fourth Amendment, which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable unless accompan_ied by p.. warrant that describes with particularity the places to be searched and the articles to be seized. Although health departments can inspect premises on an emergency basis to avert an immediate threat to health or safety, whether this authority allows them to seize documents is unclear. Health dep~~--.!-~ver, may possess subpoena power to access relevant information during a public health emergency.IS Although not necessarily rising to the level of medically privileged information, business information obtained through subpoenas may nonetheless contain valuable trade secrets or proprietary information that health departments should treat as confidential. Given the usefulness of this authority, public hewth officers who lack subpoena power may wish to consider obtaining such authority from their state legislatures.
Control of Property: Seizures, Takings,aBd--NuiSances
Public health officers also should be aware of legal authorities concerning the control of private property. In general, state laws authorize health departments to take, destroy, or restrict the u~e of private property to protect the health and safety of the community. This often includes the authority to enter suspicious premises, close facilities on an emergency basis, and seize and destroy contaminated articles. A bioterrorism event or a large-scale epidemic, however, can require greater government control of private property than that to which the public is accustomed. For example, public health officers may have to designate certain hospitals to receive infected patients and transfer noninfected patients to other facilities. In addition, health officers may have to confiscate medicines from local hospitals and pharmacies and ration limited stockpiles of pharmaceuticals among the population.14 Furthermore, public health officers may have to commandeer additional private facilities, such as hotel rooms that generally operate on separate ventilation systems and fast-food-type drive-through facilities that can easily be used to dispense medication.14 Given a large-scale event, the government could conceivably seize cell phones and other communication 14 Finally, the disposal of human corpses may be radically different in a largescale epidemic, and public health officers may be required to issue orders directing how corpses should be treated.
The major legal constrain~ on a public health department's use of private property are the constitutional requirements of due process and just compensation. The Constitution states that the government may not take private property for public use without compensating the owner.I9 Similarly, the government must generally provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing before depriving a landowner of the use of private property.20 Although the concept of compensation for public use appears simple, under what circumstances the government must compensate private landowners has been the subject of extensive litigation.
In general, courts have defined two types of "takings" that require compensation: "possessory" and "regu~ry ."2 Possessory takings, also known as physical invasions or "per se" takings, are relatively easy for courts to identify because they involve the physical possession by the government of private property.2 Therefore, if the health department were to seize a drive-through facility and use it to dispen~ medieations to the public, it would in all likelihood have to compensate the owner. Regulatory takings, on the other hand, are more difficult for courts to identify because they involve the diminution in economic value through government regulation of an owner's property.2 In general, the more the regulation diminishes the economic value associated with the private owner's property rights, the more likely courts are to examine whether the regulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking.
One reason regulatory takings are difficult for courts to identify is"' that government may legitimately abate nuisances without compensation to the owner. A public nuisance is an activi!Y--tlL-~asonably interferes with the public's use and enjoyment of a public place or that harms the health, safety, and welfare of the community? Public nuisances typically have included explosives; garbage and offal; decaying animals; improper sewage; and, more recently, places that promote high-risk sexual activity? For e~ample, under the nuisance theory, public health authorities in New York City were able to order the closing of bathhouses to prevent the spread of AIDS.21
Even though government may legitimately abate nuisances, it may not avoid paying compensation to, private property owners by simply declaring their activities to be nuisances. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that government must rely on "background principles of nuisance and property law" requiring that government find some precedent, either in common law or in the law pertaining to private nuisance suits, that allows it to declare an activity to be a nuisance?2 Some legal commentators have argued that this approach unduly hampers public health departments because it forces health officers to rely on often vague and outdated concepts of what constitutes a public health threat? 204 One example of where public health concerns have clashed with private property rights is tobacco regulation. In Philip Morris v. Harshbarger, for example, a federal court of appeals preliminarily enjoined a Massachusetts law that required cigarette manufacturers to report tobacco ingredients on the ground that it could amount to an uncompensated taking of property, specifically, the manufacturers' trade secrets.23 Accordingly, given the courts' protection of private property rights and the public's evolving understanding of what constitutes a public heath hazard, such clashes are likely to continue.
Management of Persons: Quarantine, Detention, and Treatment
A highly controversial area of public health is management of people. In general, public health officers possess authoritieS; subject to statutory and constitutional restraints, that allow them to restrict the liberty of persons through such measures as cease-and-desist orders, compelled physical examination, compelled vaccination, and possibly detention. A bioterrorism event or a large-scale epidemic, however, may re!lUir~powers, such as the ability to suspend state licensing requirements for medical personnel from outside jurisdictions, authorization of other doctors to perform the functions of medical examiners, , ability to waive informed consent requirements for collection of clinical specimens for l~boratory testing, and procedures to alloY" for the safe disposal of corpses.14 In addition, public health departments may need procedures in place to allow for large-scale isolation of infected persons and quarantine of persons believed to be exposed to an infectious agent. Although some health departments may have experience with personal-control measures with problems such as TB or me~sles, the scale and implemP-Dtation -ora bioterrorism event may be completely different. A bioterrorism event probably will require public health officers to collaborate with other agencies and organizations with which they do not have regular working relationships (e.g., public safety, law enforcement, or the National Guard). --Most public health interventions are accomplished through voluntary compliance, but coercive measures, such as detention, are sometimes necessary. Few states have a modern public health statute that specifically addresses bioterrorism. Rather, laws authorizing compulsory public health measures were enacted at different times, with different disease-causing agents or diseases in mind, and may rely on different or inconsistent medical and legal approaches to disease control. Typically, disease-control laws fall into three categories: (1) laws relating to sexually transmitted diseases, such as syphilis and gonorrhea; (2) laws targeted at specific diseases, such as J{jV' infection and TB; and (3) laws applicable to "communicable" or "contagious" diseases, a broad category dealing with a range of diseases from malaria to measles}4 In addition, some states may have within their public health statutes laws that address environmental diseases INTERVENTION DURING PUBLIC REALm EMERGENCIES 205 or conditions. The problem with most of these statutes is that they are old; for example, laws enacted 50 to 100 years ago to deal with polio may not be sufficient to deal with viral hemorrhagic fevers, foot and mouth disease, West Nile virus, or a bio-engineered weapon. Moreover, these laws may not necessarily reflect a modem understanding of infectious disease, biology, or epidemiology; current treatment methods; or present-day standards of due process.
As a practical consideration, however, adding specific statutory authority with respect to bioterrorism may be more prudent or expeditious than overhauling broad public health disease-control laws that have stood the test of time. Public health agencies must therefore decide whether to engage in wholesale revision One measure of how courts may react to a modern:day quarantine, however, may be the law surrounding involuntary detention of the mentally ill or TB patients. As the need for large-scale personal-control measures diminisIted through the advent of antibiotics and improved public health in the 1950s, courts became increasingly concerned with individual rights and due proces~a--result, courts generally scrutinize very closely government actions that result in the involuntary commitment of persons. For example, courts have held, in the context of civil commitment to mental hospitals, that involuntary commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty requiring that the state afford tl1~ individual ...with due process of law.2 In the context of detaining infectious persons, due process requires that the state provide written notice of the behavior or conditions that allegedly pose a risk to the community, access to counsel, a full and impartial hearing, and an appeal.2 Even though the state must ordinarily provide notice and a hearing before detaining someone, the law recognizes emergency exceptions in which the state may be able to afford the person a post-deprivation hearing. In such cases, the government generally has the burden of proving its case by "clear and convincing evidence," a legal standard somewhat greater than a "preponderance of the evidence" but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."2 In addition to adequate procedural protections, the state may also have to show that its interest in confinement outweighs the individual's liberty interest and
and that no other less restrictive treatment options are available. Furthermore, because public health powers are civil, designed to safeguard the public's health rather than punish the individual, the state may have to prove that detention is being carried out in a medically appropriate environment such as a hospita! or other treatment facility?
If a bioterrorisni event occurs, detention of infected persons may not be sufficient; the state may have to compel exposed persons to accept chemoprophylaxis or vaccinations, despite personal or religious objections, to ensure that they do not become contagious and infect others?5 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has reco-gnized a-constitutionally protected right of competent persons to ~ refuse medical treatment, which is derived from the common-law concept of informed consent?6 As a practical matter, a public health department may therefore have to provide an exposed person with the choice of either accepting preven~ ~py or "being isolated until the incubation period passes and he or she is no longer at risk of becoming contagious. Today, in determining whether to allow compulsory vaccination, courts also are likely to balance the state's interest in protecting the public's health against the individual's liberty interest in bodily i!ltegrity. In Wgshington v. Harper, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the context of prisoners that the state's interest in preventing dangerously mentally ill prisoners from harming themselves or others outweighed the prisoner's interest in refusing antipsychotic medications?7 In addition to balancing the government's interest against the rights of the individ--ual, courts may alse sufjfect state public health measures that single out highincidence groups for compelled treatment to "strict scrutiny," the most rigorous and least deferential form of review, if such measures are found to discriminate along racial or ethnic lines. The legal analysrs-applied to the compelled isolation of an individual with contagious pulmonary TB and the quarantine of a large number of people because of a bioterrorist's release of smallpox may be conceptually similar. In contrast, these problems are readily distinguished by factors such as the magnitude of a bioterrorist event, the fear created by the event, and the parallel criminal investigation of the perpetrators. Assuming that legal authorities are sufficient to allow public health officers to use personal-control measures, many practical questions such as who enforces a quarantine or detains an infected person anQ what acti~s government may take if a person disobeys a quarantine order may still be unanswered. Many public health officers may assume that, in the event of bioterrorism or a large-scale epidemic, the federal government will impose personal-control measures. Federal law, however, may limit the government's ability to control the movement of citizens. Regulations provide that the INTERVEN'l10N DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 207 Surgeon General, on recommendation of an advisory committee, may apprehend and examine individuals only if they are reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease and are about to move from one state to another or are a probable source of infection to individuals who, while infected, will be moving from one state to another.28 Therefore, without such an intel;:state connection, tlle federal government may have to rely on state quarantine statutes. Similarly, the PoSse Comitatus Act, subject to exceptions for insurrections and civil disturbances, generally prohibits the use of the military in civilian matters}5 These restrictions, however, do not apply to the National Guard when in state status, which may be called on by a state governor to assist in an emergency.25 Accordingly, in addition to ensuring adequate legal authorities, public health departments should begin addressing such practical considerations as who implements and enforces a quarantine order.
Legal Immunity
Even with sufficient legal authority, public health officers may feel constrained to act because of fears concerning legal liability. In general,people who believe state officials have violated their constitutional rights can file suit for damages pursuant to Title 42 of United States Code (V.S.C.) § 1983. In the public health context, for example, prisoners whom the state has compelled to accept TB treatment or those who have been involuntarily committed to I!lental hospitals have used 42 V.S.C. § 1983 to pursue damage suits against state public health officers}9 In addition, most states recognize tort actions for battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment.
J
Regardless of the availability of damage suits, state officials may be shielded from federal liability for constitutional violations under the~~ne-of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity provides that government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from civil liability under federal law if their actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would be aware.3o Therefore, in theory, even if a court were to find a public health officer's actions to be unconstitutional, the officer would be shielded from liability if the officer reasonably believed he or she was acting pursuant to legal authority and his or her actions were objectively reasonable. In Doe v. Marsh, for example, a federal court of appeals found that a public health officer who had included the names of two mv -positive persons in a government manual published in connection with an HIV/AIDS conference was entitled to qualified immunity. 3 I Specifically, the court found that, although in error, it was objectively reasonable for the health officer to believe that the two persons had waived their rights to privacy by publicly announcing their HIV status at the conference.31 THE LAW AND CORE PUBLIC HEALTH FUNCTIONS However, qualified immunity immunizes officials only from damages and not from suit, meaning that a government official would still have to defend himself or herself in court and bear the burden of Showing his or her actions were reasonable. Furthermore, the doctrine of qualified immunity applies only to individuals, not agencies, and provides immunity from federal, but not state, liability. Even without immunity from liability, some states may nonetheless indemnify government employees from money judgments provided that they act in good faith and within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, public health officers may feel more comfortable making ~ifficult decisions if they are either immunized or indemnified for decisions made in good faith.
Access to Communications: First Amendment and Media Strategy
Compulsory publrc-health p-owers require that public health departments obtain the public's trust. Although public health departments playa large role in educating the public about health, for example, by Warning about the dangers of smoking or obesity, bioterrorism requires a unique response. Such an event will' probably cause--f~-confusion, which, if government officials faif to address in an appropriate (i.e., timely, if not emergent) manner, may potentially lead to civil unrest and flight. At a minimum, public health officers will have to maintain " clear lines of communication, for example, through a command center, to provide expert advice to tpe ~lected officials. who will be managing such a crisis. 14 'To dispel rumors and provide accurate information, public health officers should also consider using communications systems such as the emergency.:response system, Internet-based websites, and toll-free telephone numbers.J4 Furthermore, experts in human relations and post-traumatic stress disorder may assist health officers in coordinating a message that will alleviate public concern. Public -health officers, moreover, must be aware of cultural differences among ethnic groups that may require dissemination of information in different languages. In the event of bioterrorism or a large-scale epidemic, government may have an interest ~n curtailing certafii media outlets that could be perceived as endangering the public through dissemination of incorrect information. The First Amendment, however, generally prohibits government from censoring information in advance of publication. Under the legal doctrine of prior restraint, such measures are treated by courts with a great deal of suspicion and are presumed unconstitutional.25 Furthermore, although the First Amendment does not encompass the right to endanger the public (the common example of shouting "fire" in a crowded building), attempts by government to control the media might lead to greater public mistrust and, therefore, prove counterproductive. A more realistic solution might -00 for government to formulate a media strategy in advance of a crisis that facilitates how public health officers will communicate with the media and the public. 209 CONCLUSION Both historically and in modem times, people have looked to government to protect them against infectious ~ents and the diseases and epidemics caused by such agents. Although this responsibility falls primarily to state and local governments under U.S. constitutional structures, the federal government nonetheless plays a significant role in safeguarding the public's health. The threat of bioterrorism and of new and emerging infectious diseases, however, has compelled state and local public health officers to understand the role of legal authorities in responding to such health threats. Although public health officers may be familiar with using emergency public health powers to collect data, close dangerous facilities, control infectious persons, and disseminate information to the public, the scale and magnitu~f a bioterrorism event requires a particularly well-coordinated and thoughtful response. Legal authorities must exist to allow public health officers to respond in a crisis, but such powers are useless unless public health officers possess the knowledge and ability to carry them out. This may, for example, require greater education of public health officers about their legal authorities and the formation of partnerships with outside communitiessuch as law enforcement, emergency-response managers, the governor's office, and federal health and emergency counterparts-that may be useful in managing the crisis. fu some areas, legal authorities may be inadequate, but in others current operating procedures or a lacKof planning may hinder the public health response to an emergency. Accordingly, public health officers should begin reaching out to groups outside the public health field and conduct exercises to test how public health and other executive powers would work in a real-life emergency. Only through such..effort~ the-public's trust in the ability of government to control and mitigate the serious public health consequences of a potential bioterrorism event be justified. 
